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A Contracting-Agency Analysis of the Association Between Firm Risk, Incentives and
Firm Performance: An Australian Perspective.
ABSTRACT: Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, (1989) suggest that the challenge of corporate
governance is to set up supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk
and effort orientation of agents to align them with the interests of principals. The research
problem is to discern the conditions that align the goals of the agent with those of the
principal.  These conditions will promote maximum effort in achieving the organisational
goal thus maximizing shareholder wealth. Therefore, the objective of this study is to
determine the efficiency of incentive contracts given certain characteristics of the firm.  That
is, the study sets out to determine whether risk firms with higher levels of incentives are
associated with higher firm performance.  In this study, data was collected from 40 of the
top 500 Australian publicly listed companies.  Information on incentives and firm
characteristics was acquired from company annual and financial reports, a mailed
questionnaire and the Australian graduate school of management risk measurement service
of the University of New South Wales.
The results of this study demonstrated how the relationship between firm risk and
performance is associated with the incentive contracts used by these firms.  In particular, the
results of this study showed that  the negative relationship between firm risk and firm
performance is weakened by higher levels of share options in executives’ compensation
contracts.  In addition the results demonstrated that the relationship between firm
performance and share ownership is dependent on the level of firm risk.  The results of this
study are expected to improve our understanding of how and why firms adopt different types
of incentives in an effort to reduce agency costs.  Rarely has prior research examined
whether the effectiveness of the incentive contract in eliminating agency costs is associated
with the environmental characteristics of the organisation (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998).
Key Words:  Risk, compensation incentives, management share ownership, share options,
firm performance.
Data Availability: Data is available from the sources identified in the text and from the
author.Page 2
A Contracting-Agency Analysis of the Association Between Firm Risk, Incentives and
Firm Performance: An Australian Perspective.
1.  INTRODUCTION
Agency theory suggests that, given certain characteristics of the firm and the organisational
environment, firms adopt particular corporate control systems to eliminate agency costs.
“Depending upon firm-specific and industry characteristics companies may adopt different
agency conflict-reducing mechanisms to varying degrees” (Bathala & Rao, 1995: 62).
However, prior research on the consequences of controls has failed to provide strong support
for the relationship between the control type on the consequence variable of firm
performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Kosnik et al, 1992).  A
potential explanation for these conflicting and/or weak results may be the failure to consider
the effect of the characteristics of the organisational environment on the link between the
firm’s control system and performance.
Because governance controls are a firm-level response to a complex environment, they may
not impact on financial performance, which may be a function of the dynamics of the
industry (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Therefore, the objective of this research is to
determine the efficiency of incentive contracts given the characteristics of the firm.
In this study, it is suggested that different incentive contracts are optimal for different firms,
for the simple reason that each firm faces its own management problems, and hence finds its
own solution.  “Each firm has different governance needs depending on its economic and
regulatory environment, as well as exogenously determined market forces that may also
discipline management” (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998: 384).  In addition, the firm adopts a
particular control package.  Control mechanisms are simultaneously and endogenously
determined so that economies in agency costs are attained.  Therefore, links to performance
are not necessarily directional as other factors may determine the level of control
mechanism.  Each firm’s governance needs vary with firm-specific and environmental
conditions.Page 3
Using regression analysis of a cross section of 40 Australian firms, the results of this study
showed that the relationship between incentives and firm performance is dependent on the
level of firm risk.  In particular, the results of this study showed that higher levels of share
options in executives’ compensation contracts weaken the negative relationship between
firm risk and firm performance.  The results also demonstrated that the level of firm risk
weakens the positive relationship between firm performance and share ownership.  When
testing whether the relationship between compensation incentives and firm performance is
dependent on the level of firm risk, the analysis failed to produce significant results.
However, further analysis demonstrated a positive and significant relationship between risk
and non-cash bonuses and a significant and negative relationship between risk and cash
bonuses.  This result suggests that the level of firm risk is associated with the type of
compensation incentives used by these firms to motivate their executives.
By looking at the firm’s incentive contracts as a collection of controls available to firms, this
study overcomes some of the limitations of prior research.  To concentrate on a single
element in the corporate governance-firm performance juncture is unlikely to lead to
measurable improvements in corporate performance (Baliga et al, 1996).  The determinants
of firm performance are highly complex and interrelated and do not appear to be capable of
isolation in the context of a single variable.
II.  BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Firm Risk and Incentives
Firm risk refers to the underlying volatility in the firm’s earnings stream and has been
identified as a source of agency conflict (Bathala & Rao, 1995). In an effort to reduce these
agency conflicts, firms use supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the
risk and effort orientation of agents to align them with the interests of principals (Tosi &
Gomez-Mejia, 1989).  Core et al, (1999) suggest that firm risk, both as a measure of the
firm’s information environment and the risk of its operating environment, is also a
potentially important determinant of the level of executives’ incentives.  Agency theoryPage 4
emphasizes how corporate governance issues demonstrate the trade-off between the costs of
monitoring behaviour and the costs of bearing risk.
Agents are assumed to be self-interested, utility-maximizing, risk and effort averse and must
therefore be persuaded to act in the best interests of shareholders, that is, to engage in
behaviors that maximize shareholder wealth.  Managers, unlike the owners, have already
invested most of their non-diversifiable and non-tradable human capital in the firm.
Therefore, since agent’s employment security and income are inextricably tied to one firm,
agents are assumed to exhibit risk aversion in decisions regarding the firm in order to lower
risk to personal wealth (Williamson, 1975).
The contract is designed to motivate a risk and effort-averse agent to exert unobservable
effort in an environment characterized by uncertainty (Banker et al, 1996; Brickley et al,
1997).  The control question encompasses how this risk is shared between the principal and
the agent.
Incentives, both compensation and equity, are governance controls which provide targets,
such as financial results, for managers to achieve.  This type of control approximates a
market contracting arrangement, where the manager is free to select the method of achieving
the desired result.  Hence, incentives entail little monitoring, security holder direction and
effort and provide objective measures of results.  However, these controls transfer risk from
the principal to the agent and such transfers may be costly for the principal because the
manager will demand restitution for the increased risk imposed. Incentive contracts are
reactive in the sense that it provides no mechanism for preventing mistakes and can elicit
myopic behaviour  (Chow  et al, 1996).  Subsequently, the literature suggests that such
incentive schemes may cause the agent to act opportunistically (Chow et al, 1994, Kosnik et
al, 1992; Fama & Jensen, 1983).
Firms may offer a range of incentives to their managers in an attempt to motivate effort and
align the interests of managers with those of the shareholders. Three forms of incentives are
considered in this study, compensation bonuses, share options and share ownership.  ThePage 5
research question is whether the owner-manager conflict is reduced by the extent that
compensation contracts contain shares, share options and remuneration that is tied to firm
performance measures.
The efficiency of incentive contracts is dependent on several factors.  In particular, Beatty
and Zajac (1994: 313) suggest the following.  (1) The ability of firms to use executive
compensation contracts to address managerial incentive problems is hampered by risk-
bearing concerns that stem from the risk aversion of top executives.  (2) This problem is
particularly severe for riskier firms.  (3) Firms seek to address this problem by structuring
their boards of directors to ensure sufficient monitoring of managerial behavior, given the
magnitude of the agency problem.
Beatty and Zajac (1994) found that riskier firms1 are less likely to include stock options in
management compensation contracts, have a lower proportion of incentive compensation to
total compensation2, and have lower levels of management share ownership.  Their results
suggest that there is an inverse relationship between levels of firm risk and the degree to
which incentive compensation for top executives is used.  However, they did not test the
efficiency of these contracts.  Subsequently, it is posited in this study that the relationship
between incentives and firm performance is dependent on the level of firm risk.
Incentives
Agency theorists argue that incentive contracts may be designed in response to agency
problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  As such, incentives represent
an alternative control mechanism for motivating and monitoring executives.  The principal's
objective is to construct a compensation policy that aligns the agent's interests with those of
                                                                
1 The study identified four proxies for risk.  (1) The number of risk factors described in the IPO registration
statement, where top management must explicitly list and discuss the risk factors facing the IPO firm.  (2) The
choice of a best-efforts or firm-commitment offering contract in the IPO underwriting.  (3) The reported
profitability of the IPO firm. (4) A regression of the actual after-market standard deviation from the post-IPO
market on the three previous risk measures (profitability indicator, number of risks disclosed, and type of
underwriting contract) for all firms.
2 Calculated as (the value of executives' stock options plus the change in value of stock held by executives in
the pre-IPO year) divided by (cash compensation plus the value of executives' stock options plus the change in
value of stock held by executives in the pre-IPO year)Page 6
the principal.  Fama (1983) and Holmstrom & Milgrom (1987) stressed the fact that while
contingent compensation may seem to have desirable incentive and motivational properties
relative to non-contingent forms of compensation, it also has undesirable risk-bearing
properties.  Such a compensation contract would cause a manager to bear risk that could be
more efficiently borne by diversified stockholders.  Why then do firms use incentives that
are based on firm performance?
Incentive contracts have two components.  The first component compensates agents for
accepting higher levels of risk and transfers the risk from the agent to the principal in the
form of greater levels of fixed salaries.  However, this component does not motivate the
agent to act in the shareholder’s interest.  Therefore, a fixed salary incurs greater agency
costs, as it does not deter managerial opportunism.  The second part aligns the goals of the
agent with those of the principal using incentives based on firm-specific performance.  This
motivates agents to adopt value-increasing actions.  A compensation contract strikes an
appropriate balance between the two.  However, even an efficient system of incentive
alignment will still result in some interest divergence, that is, the residual loss.  Therefore,
the incentive compensation, the cost of monitoring and the residual loss represent the agency
costs.  Byrd et al (1998: 18) made the following point: “An effective compensation contract
will provide managers with incentives, at the lowest possible cost to the stockholders, to
make decisions that stockholders would prefer them to make.”
Compensation Incentives
Contingent pay can include short-term pay, such as cash bonus and other annual payments or
long-term pay such as restricted stock and stock options granted or other long-term benefit
plans.  These two forms of contingent compensation have different attributes, which may
affect executives’ behaviour.  For instance, short-term incentives provide agents with
immediate rewards that can be used at their discretion.  Cash bonuses in compensation
schemes give executives the option of using the cash to buy a diversified portfolio, thus
reducing their risk in the firm.  However, they also encourage agents to focus on short run
gains rather than long-term profitability.  In contrast, long-term compensation is an
important incentive alignment mechanism that offers executives rewards for increasingPage 7
shareholder wealth.  Therefore, altering executives decision horizons to long-term gains
rather than short-term rewards.
When a compensation scheme includes both base3 pay and ex ante contingent pay that is
contractually linked to firm performance targets, agents are faced with two choices.  Agents
can safeguard future base pay (i.e., reducing employment risk), with conservative firm
strategies that smooth income streams, create sales growth at the expense of profitability,
hoard cash, and so forth (Williamson, 1975).  Alternatively they can pursue contingent pay
with riskier firm strategies that promise better firm performance and, therefore, contingent
pay awards.
Firm Risk, Compensation Incentives and Firm Performance
Agency theory suggests that there is a positive relationship between incentive compensation
and firm performance.  However, risk has been identified as a major variable that impacts on
an individual’s motivation and acceptance of incentives and consequently the type of
incentives and monitoring adopted by the firm (e.g. Bathala & Rao, 1995; Beatty & Zajac,
1994).
Banker and Datar (1989) suggest that compensation risk, that is, compensation mix, may
either increase or decrease with firm risk.  If the firm employs contingency-based
compensation policies that link rewards to firm performance, this places manager’s
compensation at risk.  Therefore the manager stands to make considerable financial gains if
the firm is profitable, but may stand to lose financially if the firm is unprofitable.  This may
lead to a conservative outlook by the manager and a loss of potential profit for the firm.
Alternatively, it would seem intuitive that the greater the proportion of a manager’s salary
that is derived from the firm’s performance, the harder the manager should work to achieve
any profit objective.
                                                                
3 Base pay refers to fixed pay or the percentage of pay received regardless of compensation bonuses or
perquisites.Page 8
The results of prior studies testing the relationship between risk and incentive compensation
have been mixed.  Beatty and Zajac (1994) found that riskier firms have a lower proportion
of incentive compensation to total compensation.  Munter and Kren (1995) found that
uncertainty was negatively related to outcome-based compensation schemes.  Stroh et al
(1996), found that during high levels of risk, organisations shift the risk to managers in the
form of variable pay rather than paying them a risk premium in the form of a higher fixed
cash compensation.  Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) found that executives in firms with
more volatile stock prices will have less performance-based compensation. They also found
that CEOs of less risky firms have larger share holdings in their own firms.
Very few studies have tested whether the efficiency of compensation contracts is dependent
on the characteristics of the firm.  Bloom and Milkovich (1998) tested whether risk4 is
related to the incidence of base and incentive pay and whether risk moderates the
relationship between incentive pay5 and organisational performance.  They argued that
business risk would be related to managerial compensation contracts and that this
relationship will be related to firm performance6.  They found that three of the four measures
of risk7 were negatively related to the use of incentive pay.  The measure of unsystematic
stock market risk was positively related to incentive pay.  They also found that unsystematic
income and stock market risk were positively related to the use of base compensation but not
related to income and stock market systematic risk.
 When testing the relationship between risk and incentives on firm performance, Bloom and
Milkovich (1998) found a significant negative interaction indicating that firms with higher
unsystematic stock market risk that use incentive pay have lower performance8.  However,
                                                                
4 Risk was defined as the volatility in an organization’s income stream and stock market returns and was
computed as both systematic and unsystematic components of both risk measures.
5 Incentive pay was measured as the ratio of bonus-to-base pay and was therefore a measure of short-term
incentives.  Long-term incentives such as share options were not included in the analysis.
6 Performance was measured on the basis of total shareholder return, being year-end closing price of stock plus
adjusted dividends divided by the stock return from the previous year.
7 Both systematic and unsystematic income stream volatility and systematic stock market return volatility.
8 The three interactions using incentives and systematic stock market risk, systematic and unsystematic income
stream risk were all insignificant.Page 9
incentives and better performance were related in firms with high systematic income risk
although performance was negative for these firms disregarding the compensation contracts.
In this study it is suggested that relying on fixed or base salary may fail to motivate agents.
Therefore, higher risk firms tend to adopt incentive contracts based on compensation
bonuses designed to motivate executives to adopt value-increasing strategies which increase
shareholder wealth.  Adding more contingent pay to a given compensation plan has no effect
on agent risk bearing since its loss does not pose a threat to the agent’s perceived wealth
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia 1998).  This implies that among higher risk firms, greater use of
incentives, will be positively related to firm performance.  In other words, the level of
incentive compensation will weaken the negative relationship between firm risk and
performance.  This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: The negative relationship between firm risk and performance will be weaker for
firms with higher levels of executive compensation incentives.
Share Options
As a form of incentive, stock options have the potential to motivate executives to adopt a
long-term perspective to decision making and align executives’ goals with those of the
shareholders.  Anthony et al (1992: 643) suggests that “The major motivational benefit of
stock option plans is that they direct managers’ energies toward the long-term, rather than
the short-term, performance of the company.”  Share options represent deferred
remuneration because they can be exercised at the manager’s discretion.  Executives
therefore respond by preferring actions that enhance the value of their options.  Bilimoria,
(1997: 841) suggests that: “Performance based plans explicitly tying bonus payments to
specified growth targets, bonus deferred and paid in the form of stock contingent on
performance in subsequent years, and stock options or stock appreciation rights are
mechanisms to extend managerial decision horizons consistent with the long run emphasis
of the market”Page 10
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) suggest that the large pay-performance sensitivities of their
study were primarily the result of incentives provided by the executives’ ownership of stock
and stock options.  When the measure of compensation excluded the change in the value of
existing options, the median pay-performance sensitivity fell by 55%.   Prior studies suggest
that firm performance is positively associated with share option plans (Aggarwal &
Samwick 1999; Anthony et al 1992; Bilimoria 1997; Jensen & Murphy 1990).
Firm Risk, Share Options and Firm Performance
It may be argued that share options will negate the volatility in earnings as the compensation
is deferred and can be exercised at the executive’s discretion.  The relationship between
owned equity shares and owned stock options demonstrate the compensation risk executives
are subject to.  Share ownership gives the owners voting rights and a linear payoff that
increases with their firms’ performance.  In contrast, share options grants recipients the
rights to acquire equity at a future date with a convex payoff as they need not exercise the
option if the share price has not increased.  Byrd et al (1998) suggest that executives accept
more risk in the form of stock return volatility when they have share options rather than
when they own shares in the firm.  Share options tend to increase in value with additional
stock return variability.  Begley and Feltham (1999) suggest that options are similar to
shares except that they fully benefit from share price increases but do not incur losses if the
share price falls below the exercise price.  Therefore, options do not have the same risk
bearing properties associated with share ownership.  As a consequence, executives that hold
more options than shares are able to take more risk, are more likely to invest in riskier assets
and have less interest in hedging and managing risk (Abdel-Khalik, 1999).  The higher is the
risk the firm takes, the higher is the expected return, and the wealth of option-holders
increases with success and does not diminish by failure (Smith & Stultz, 1985).  Therefore,
firms will align executives’ goals with those of the shareholders by including share options
in their compensation contracts.  The preceding discussion leads to the following
hypotheses:
H2: The negative relationship between firms’ risk and performance will be
weakened by higher levels of executives’ share option holdings.Page 11
Management Share Ownership
Share ownership can be an important source of incentives and power for executives as well
as outside shareholders.  It typically bestows voting rights, which can give internal and
external shareholders a voice in the governance of a corporation.  Distribution of stock
among these stakeholders can, therefore, have a significant impact on corporate actions that
are dependent on shareholder voting.  It therefore follows that share ownership aligns the
interests of executives with shareholders as executives are less likely to engage in actions
that are not in the interests of shareholders.
Agency theory suggests that stock ownership by management can reduce the underlying
agency problem: the more stock management owns, the stronger their motivation to work to
raise the value of the firm's stock and act in ways that are in shareholders' best interests.
This is demonstrated by prior research where stock ownership was found to be associated
with the adoption of poison pills.  Mallete & Fowler (1992) suggest that directors who are
more aligned with management than with shareholders could be expected to seek poison pill
protection because these protective measures are generally in management's best interest.
They found that equity ownership of inside directors affected the probability that a firm
would pass a poison pill; a board was more likely to adopt a pill when inside director share
holdings were low.
Firm Risk, Management Share Ownership and Firm Performance
Two views are expressed regarding the impact of managerial share ownership on
shareholder welfare.  Some authors have argued that managerial share ownership should be
viewed with caution (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Stulz, 1988).  According to formal agency
theory, substantial managerial share ownership can have undesirable risk-bearing properties.
That is, as executives have already invested their non-diversifiable human capital in the firm,
increased share ownership transfers additional risk to executives.  This increased agency cost
must more than offset any increase in compensation required by executives for bearing a
greater level of firm-specific risk from their ownership of firm shares.  This approach
suggests that this additional risk can lead to risk avoiding behavior on the part of executives,Page 12
which is not in the interest of shareholders.  Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) found that CEOs
of less risky firms have larger holdings in their own firms.  Their results support the
principal/agent model, suggesting that considerations such as firm risk are incorporated in
executive compensation contracts.  This argument suggests that executives would have low
share ownership in firms with high risk.
 In contrast, theoretical and empirical works based on a positivist approach to agency theory
have advocated stock ownership as a means to align the interest of top executives with that
of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Singh and Harianto, 1989).  That is, if
executives own stock in a company they are less likely to take actions that are not in the
interests of shareholders.
It is suggested in this study that the relationship between executive share ownership and firm
performance is dependent on the risk of the firm.  Following on from the suggestion that
there may be a negative relationship between firm risk and management share ownership, it
is likely that firm performance will be affected by that relationship.  As high management
share ownership in a high-risk firm leads to risk avoiding behaviour, it is likely that the
relationship between management share ownership and firm performance will be dependent
on the level of risk in the firm.  In other words, a negative relationship among firm risk,
management share ownership and firm performance is expected.  This leads to the following
hypothesis:
H3: The positive relationship between firm performance and executive share
ownership will be weaker at higher levels of firm risk.
III.  RESEARCH DESIGN
Data
Executive directors are used as a proxy for managers/executives in this paper due to the
difficulty in attaining information on managers’ share ownership and share options9 (see
                                                                
9 Firms report executive directors share options and share ownership in the financial reports as part of the
corporate governance disclosure requirements of the Australian stock exchange.Page 13
Morck et al. 1988).  Three methods were employed to collect the data for this study.  Final
samples include those with complete data for the selected variables.
1.  Archival data on firms’ financial characteristics and executive directors share option and
share ownership was acquired from 1998 company financial reports provided by
Connect 4, an electronic database of 43710 of the top 500 Australian company annual
reports11.
2.  Risk measures of beta and the standard deviation of monthly returns were obtained from
the Australian graduate school of management risk measurement service of the
University of New South Wales.
3.  A fax-reply questionnaire was used to collect data on compensation policies. As the
archival data may not provide all the necessary information on remuneration details a
specifically designed questionnaire was sent to the company secretary requesting
information on performance-based compensation packages.  Prior to distribution to
company secretaries, the questionnaire was sent to academics at Deakin University
Australia and City University Hong Kong for comment.  Changes were made based on
recommendations.  Responses to the questionnaire were received from 49 companies
giving a response rate of only 11.2%.  The poor response rate is likely to be attributable
to the timing of the questionnaire, that is, mailed on December 10, immediately prior to
Christmas and the perceived sensitive nature of the information12.  In addition, 9
companies were dropped from the analysis due to missing data for testing the
hypotheses, leaving a sample of 40 firms.
Measurement of variables
Firm Risk
Risk has been identified as a major variable that impacts on an individual’s motivation and
acceptance of incentives and consequently the type of incentives adopted by the firm.  A
measure of firm risk is volatility, which refers to the underlying volatility in the firm’s
                                                                
10 73 trust companies were dropped from the original 500 companies.
11 The top 500 companies in terms of market capitalization.
12 Some firms refused to participate in the research claiming the nature of the information requested was too
sensitive and that they already provide the necessary statutory requirements in their annual report.Page 14
earnings stream.  Prior research has used the standard deviation of monthly returns and beta
as a measure of firm risk (Aggrawal & Samwick 1999; Carr 1997).  Therefore, the relevant
proxies for firm risk are total variance measures (Core et al, 1999).  Two measures of risk
are used in this study:
1.  RISK =  The total risk of the firm is measured as the standard deviation of the
rate of return on equity for the company.  It is expressed as a rate of return per month,
and is computed from the (continuously compounded) equity rates of return for the
company’s equity13.  Such rates of return are distributed approximately normally.  This
measure encompasses both systematic and unsystematic risk (Carr, 1997); and
2.  BETA =  is the slope coefficient from a simple linear regression of the
company equity rate of return on that of the market index, where both are measured as
deviations from the risk free rate.  Beta is a measure of market risk expressed as a
coefficient whose average value for the market as a whole is unity.  A high beta stock
(beta greater than unity) is one that is relatively sensitive to market movements.
These measures are designed to indicate the risk of the firm.  As Carr (1997) suggests, beta
captures the systematic component of total risk.  Executives typically have limited
opportunity to diversify, partly due to the fact that they receive restricted stock options in
their own company.  Therefore the risk that they are exposed to is the total risk14 rather than
the systematic risk intrinsic in a diversified portfolio.  Shareholders can select a diversified
portfolio that eliminates the unsystematic risk15.  This implies that the agent, whose
compensation mix includes firm-specific stock, has to bear the total risk.  Therefore
executives are interested in the variance in their own firm's stock and earnings; hence
variance is the appropriate measure when testing the principal-agent model (Aggarwal &
Samwick, 1999).
                                                                
13 It is measured over the four-year period ending in the last month of 1998.  All measurable monthly returns
in the four-year interval are included.  Individual monthly returns measure total shareholder returns for the
company, including the effects of various capitalization changes such as bonus issues, renounceable and non-
renounceable issues, share splits, consolidations, and dividend distributions.
14 Total risk consists of systematic risk, which is a measure of how the asset (share) covaries with the
economy, and unsystematic risk, which is independent of the economy.
15 CAPM theory suggests that shareholders can diversify away all risk except the risk of the economy as a
whole, which is undiversifiable (Copeland & Weston, 1988).Page 15
Incentives
Compensation incentives are measured as cash plus non-cash bonus as a percentage of total
remuneration and labeled TOTAL INCENT %16.  Non-cash bonus include such things as
superannuation contributions, contributions to medical funds, provision of vehicles and
associated expenses but excludes share options.  A high score indicates that these firms
motivate executives with compensation incentives.
EDS OPTIONS TO SHARES RATIO = number of executive directors’ share options
/[number of executive directors’ shares options + number of executive directors’ share
ownership].  This measure determines whether executives hold a greater proportion of share
options than shares, which suggests that firms use share options rather than shares for goal
alignment.  For example, the ratio of executive directors share options to shares where share
options are 1500,000 and share holdings are 156,500 is calculated as
1500,000/[1500,000+156,000) = .906.  This means that for executive directors in this firm,
90.6% of their share and option holdings are in the form of options.
Management share ownership, EDs SHARE %, the percentage of executive directors’
shareholdings, is the total number of ordinary shares held by executive directors divided by
the total number of issued ordinary shares.
Firm Performance
Performance measures include ROE, EPS, and Profit margin.  Previous studies (e.g. Gomez-
Mejia et al, 1987) have suggested using factor analysis to integrate various measures of firm
performance.  However, it may be suggested (Carr, 1997) that one measure should be used
independently as many of the measures are highly correlated because they are derived from
the same financial data. The measure of firm performance in this study is return on equity
(ROE).  ROE is measured as income after tax and before abnormal items is divided by total
equity minus minority interests.  Although managerial discretion may affect accounting
returns through smoothing and accounting manipulations in the short run, in the long run
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accounting and market measures of returns should reflect the same economic factors for the
firm (Carr, 1997).
Control Variables
A firm that has high leverage is likely to be viewed as a firm that may have liquidity
problems and therefore potentially more risky.  Leverage is measured as current and non-
current borrowings divided by total equity. This ratio indicates how firms choose to finance
operations.  The lower the ratio, the greater the protection for lenders, who rank before
shareholders.  Because book values are used to write debt contracts this measure more
accurately proxies for debt holder and shareholder conflicts than market-based measures
(Skinner, 1883).
Firm size is included as a control variable in the analysis because it has been found to be
associated with various firm characteristics.  Firm size is measured as the book value of total
assets.  A natural logarithmic transformation is performed to normalize data and the
transformed variable is labeled LNASSET.
Non-executive board members are seen as arbitrating disagreements between internal
executives and residual claimants by such functions as setting executive compensation or
nominating replacements for top management (Conyon & Peck, 1998; Tosi, et al, 1997).
Therefore, the independent non-executive director is perceived to be the medium by which
financial accountability is achieved by acting on shareholders’ behalf.  Board composition,
NED, is measured as the ratio of non-executive directors to executive directors on the board
of directors, non-executive directors divided by total number of directors.  The higher the
ratio the greater the proportion of non-executive directors.
IV.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. The mean score for the standard deviation of
monthly returns (firm risk) is 10.05 with a Beta of 1.03, suggesting that the firms move in
unity with the market, on average.  Fifty percent of executive directors’ total share and
option ownership is in the form of share options.  Executive directors receive 21.3% of theirPage 17
total remuneration as incentives, excluding share options.  The firms’ average size
($1,579,560,000), leverage (65%) and ROE (5.6%) for 1998 is also shown in the table.  The
average number and proportion of non-executive directors (NED) are 5 and 71%
respectively, as disclosed in the 1998 annual reports.  Executive directors of the sampled
Australian firms own only a small percentage of the firm’s total issued shares (2%).
** Insert Table 1 about here  **
Univariate Tests
The Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the variables of interest are given in the Table 2
below.  The correlation matrix reveals a negative correlation between RISK and firm
performance (ROE), the proportion of executive directors’ options to share and option
ownership, leverage, size (assets) and board monitoring (NEDS) and a positive correlation
with executive directors share ownership.  ROE is positively correlated with assets (size),
and the proportion of executive directors’ options, and negatively correlated with
executives’ proportion of shares.
** Insert Table 2 about here  **
Multivariate Tests
Regression analysis was used to test and evaluate the contribution and significance of the
hypotheses.  The first regression tests the association between firm risk and the independent
variables of incentives, director share ownership and share options and the control variables
of size, board monitoring and leverage.  This was done to ensure the assumptions made
about the relationships between the dependant and independent variables were valid.  The
second regression tests the stated hypothesis, that is, to test the interactions.
Table 3 reports the results of a regression model to test the main effects.  The results
demonstrate a negative and significant relationship between RISK and the proportion of
NEDs. This suggests that the uncertainty associated with the environment of risk firms
creates a demand by executives to have their performance evaluated by a greater proportion
of executive directors on the board.  It is likely that executive directors have the expertise toPage 18
differentiate between the effects of the environment and outcomes of management decisions
on firm performance.  There is also negative and significant relationship between RISK and
firm size and RISK and ROE, suggesting that risk firms are small and struggling firms.  The
positive relationship between RISK and executives options to shares and remuneration
incentives and the negative association with executives share ownership is in the direction
hypothesized but is not significant.  The model explains 73% of the variation in firm risk and
does not demonstrate multicollinearity.
The results of testing the hypotheses are reported in Table 4.  The model explains 83% of the
variation in the sampled firms’ ROE. When testing the first hypothesis, that is, whether risk
firms’ performance is related to the incidence of compensation incentives, the interaction
term was positive, suggesting that firm performance is positively related to higher levels of
firm risk and executive incentive compensation17.  In other words, higher levels of incentive
compensation weaken the negative relationship between firm risk and performance.
However the result is insignificant, thus failing to support H1.
Subsequently, further analysis was carried out separating compensation incentives into cash
and non-cash18 bonuses.  The results revealed a positive and significant relationship between
RISK and executives’ non-cash bonus (R
2 = .346; B = .674; p = .003) and a negative and
significant relationship with executives’ cash bonus (R
2 = .229; B = -.483; p = .039).  This
result suggests that risk firms motivate executives to extend their decision horizons with
non-cash incentives. The higher the level of firm risk the more firms use non-cash incentives
to motivate executives to bear the total risk inherent in the firms’ environment, without
placing their compensation at greater risk.  The negative relationship between firm risk and
cash incentives is because if a firm has volatile earnings/stock prices, executives may adopt
shortsighted strategies that are not in shareholders’ interests.  Therefore, the employment
contract of risky firms will include non-cash bonuses rather than cash bonuses because cash
bonuses offer short run incentives whereas high-risk firms require long-term commitment to
cope with the riskiness of the firm.  However, the interactions of risk and non-cash or cash
                                                                
17 Cash and non-cash incentives excluding share options.Page 19
bonuses on firm performance were not significant (B = .187; p = .654 and B = -.189; p =
.672, respectively).
There is a significant and positive interaction of RISK and the proportion of executives’
options to shares on firm performance reported in Table 4.  This result suggests that the
negative association between firm risk and performance is weakened at higher levels of
executives’ options to shareholdings, thus supporting H2.  As share options do not have risk-
bearing properties associated with share ownership, executives that hold more options than
shares are less likely to be risk averse and as a consequence these firms have higher levels of
performance.  There is a negative association between a firm’s ROE and the proportion of
options to shares held by executives.  A possible interpretation of this result may be that
executives’ in these firms have exercised their options because firm performance is
increasing and therefore hold more shares than options.
The results reported in Table 4 demonstrate a significant and negative interaction of RISK
and executive directors’ shareholdings on firm performance (ROE).  The results reported in
Table 4 reveal that the performance of the firm is negatively related to firm risk.  The results
also show that firm performance is positively related to executive directors’ shareholdings.
As a consequence, the interaction of firm risk and executive directors’ shareholdings is
negative and significant, thus supporting H 3.  The result shows that firm performance
declines at higher levels of firm risk and executive directors’ shareholdings.  In other words
the positive relationship between firm performance and executive directors’ shareholdings is
weakened at higher levels of firm risk.  Increasing levels of executives’ wealth at risk by
way of share ownership leads to risk avoiding behaviour and a resulting reduction in firm
performance.  Therefore, the results provide support for the proposition that executive share
ownership should not be used as a governance control by firms with high risk.
The results of testing the hypotheses using BETA as the measure of market risk are reported
in Table 5.  The results when testing the hypotheses are similar to those reported in Table 4.
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
18 Non-cash bonuses, excluding share options, include payments to superannuation funds, provision of
vehicles and associated allowances, contributions to medical funds, etc.Page 20
V. CONCLUSIONS
The results of testing the hypotheses suggest that assuming an agent is risk-averse does not
capture the full range of attitudes and behaviors agents’ exhibit under risk.  The results may
suggest that executives have greater risk bearing preference due to their level of skill.  In
other words, executives self-select firms that offer incentives as a means of achieving higher
levels of total remuneration.  In addition, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) suggest that, to
the extent that executive wealth is affected by firm performance, executives are likely to
perceive more risk to personal wealth (i.e., risk bearing) under conditions of gain.  However
they perceive less risk to that wealth under conditions of loss because there is nothing to lose
but the loss itself.
This study tested the effectiveness of incentive contracts for firms with risk, that is, the
relationship of incentive contracts to firm performance given the level of firm risk. The
positive (but insignificant) interaction between risk and compensation incentives on firm
performance suggests that decision-makers in high-risk firms adopt value-increasing
strategies when their compensation is tied to firm performance. Further analysis showed that
risk firms choose to motivate executives with non-cash bonuses rather than cash bonuses
which may elicit myopic decision-making.  The positive association between executives’
proportion of share options to shares and ROE documents the significance of executives’
options as an incentive mechanism in high-risk firms that reduces agency costs.  Therefore,
this result suggests that options do not have the same risk bearing properties as share
ownership; this notion is supported by the following result.  The negative relationship
between risk and share ownership on ROE shows that using share ownership as an incentive
to align agent and principal goals may increase agency costs and risk avoiding behaviour.
Limitations and Future Research
Limitations of this study include sample bias and cross-sectional analysis.  The sample was
not randomly chosen as the data was collected from the top 500 (in terms of market
capitalization) Australian publicly listed companies for 1998.  Using a questionnaire to
collect data on incentives has the inherent bias associated with non-response.  It is likely thatPage 21
only firms that use executive incentive compensation packages or are willingly disclose their
incentive policies responded to the questionnaire.  A wider sample of firms, both small and
large, might add additional information for testing the relationships posited in this study.
Cross-sectional analysis of the data does not determine causality of association.  Ideally the
data collection should cover at least two to five years.  The hypotheses presented in this
research also imply that firms will change their incentive contracts over time as the relative
level of firms’ risk varies.  If the risk changes for a given firm over time, theory predicts
changes associated with the firm’s, incentives.  To test the preference of firms for a
particular incentive contract would require time-series analysis.  Therefore, a further area of
research involves testing the stated hypotheses over time.
This research tested the notion that risk is a major variable that is associated with an
individual’s motivation and acceptance of incentive contracts and is therefore related to firm
performance.  Risk can be measured in many ways.  The measures used in this study are
designed to indicate the riskiness of the firm.  However, a multidimensional measure of risk
may indicate a stronger association with incentive contracts and firm performance.  This
research has shown that risk is associated with firms’ strategic performance relationships.
Researchers may gain a better understanding of the conditions under which agency
predictions hold and test the efficiency of contracts by examining different sources of risk
and how they are related to corporate governance decisions.  A fertile area of research is to
examine the dimensions of risk and their relationship to organisational strategies and
outcomes.
Despite the limitation of this research due to the experimental design, the findings provide
insight into the choice of incentive contracts adopted by firms and the efficacy of the
contract in terms of firm performance.  The particular contribution of this study is to show
that not all incentives available to firms are value increasing to all firms.  Rather greater firm
performance is dependent on the characteristics of the firm that endogenously determine the
mix of incentives selected by the firms.Page 22
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics for untransformed variables (N = 40)

















Mean 10.05 1.03 .056 .017 21.34 .501 5.13 1.9 .709 1579560 .648
Median 8.80 1.07 .086 .001 18.40 .505 5.50 2 .732 447679 .632
Std.
Dev.
4.011 .644 .128 .043 15.49 .368 2.13 .810 .141 3276914 .454
Min. 5.00 -.91 -.459 0 0 0 1 1 .33 9187 0




6.95 .698 .019 .0003 11.94 .142 3.25 1 6 132992 .226
8.80 1.07 .086 .001 18.40 .505 5.50 2 .732 447679 .632
12.40 1.44 .134 .011 30.38 .922 6 2 .851 1445200 .809
RISK = the standard deviation of the rate of return on equity for the company
BETA = regression of the company equity rate of return on that of the market index
ROE = earnings after tax before abnormals/ total equity
Eds TOTAL
INCENT %
= Executive directors total cash and non-cash bonus divided by total remuneration
EDs SHARE = percentage of executive directors share holdings to total shares
EDsOPT = ratio of executive directors share options to total share and option  holdings
NEDs = non-executive directors
EDs = executive directors
NED = ratio of non-executive directors to total directors
Total assets = Total assets in $’000’s
LEV = current and non current borrowings/total equityPage 26
TABLE 2
























1 1.00 .208 -.720** -.303* .296* -.200 -.007* -.731** -.437
2 .208 1.000 -.099 .118 -.171 .033 -.090 .194 .181
3 -.720** -.099 1.000 .392** -.343* .230 -.060 .565** .084
4 -.303* .188 .392** 1.000 -.414** .350* .091 .399** .157
5 .296* -.171 -.343* -.414** 1.000 -.347* .113 -.376** -.220
6 -.200 .033 .230 .350* -.347* 1.000 .195 .376** .146
7 -.007* -.090 -.060 .091 .113 .195 1.000 .100 .272*
8 -.731** .194 .565** .399** -.376** .376** .100 1.000 .480**
9 -.437** .181 .084 .157 -.220 .146 .272* .480** 1.000
Mean 10.05 1.026 .056 .501 .017 21.34 .648 12.98 .709
Std Dev 4.011 .644 .128 .368 .043 15.49 .454 1.60 .141
1. RISK = the standard deviation of the rate of return on equity for the company
2. BETA = regression of the company equity rate of return on that of the market index
3. ROE = earnings after tax before abnormals/ total equity
4. EDsOPT = ratio of executive directors share options to total share and option  holdings
5. EDs SHARE
%
= executive directors share holdings to total shares
6. EDs TOTAL
INCENT %
= executive directors total cash and non-cash bonus divided by total remuneration
7. LEV = current and non current borrowings/total equity
8. LNASSET = log of assets to normalise
9. NED = ratio of non-executive directors to total directors
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)Page 27
TABLE 3





Explanatory variables Beta t Sig. VIF
LNASSET ? -.369 -2.661 .012 2.251
LEV + .058 .569 .573 1.205
NED - -.257 -2.249 .032 1.523
EDS SHARE % - -.050 -.449 .656 1.455
EDsOPT + .050 .454 .653 1.422
EDS INCENT % + .054 .498 .622 1.348









Explanatory variables Beta t Sig. VIF
LNASSET + .143 1.110 .274 2.844
LEV - -.118 -1.275 .212 1.478
NED + -.180 -1.804 .082 1.722
EDS SHARE % + .683 2.634 .025 14.402
EDsOPT + -.807 -3.016 .005 12.362
EDS INCENT % + .078 .316 .755 10.573
RISK - -.789 -3.835 .001 7.301
Experimental variables
RISK * EDS OPT + .980 3.715 .001 12.019
RISK * EDS SHARE % - -.781 -2.557 .016 16.118
RISK * EDS INCENT % + .078 .316 .755 10.573
R
2 .832
RISK * EDS OPT = Interactive term = risk * ratio of executive directors share options to
total share and option  holdings
RISK * EDS SHARE % = Interactive term = risk * percentage of executive directors share
holdings to total shares
RISK * EDS INCENT % = Interactive term = risk * Executive directors total cash and non-cash
bonus divided by total remunerationPage 29
TABLE 5





Explanatory variables Beta t Sig. VIF
LNASSET + .437 3.230 .003 1.815
LEV - .002 .022 .983 1.270
NED + -.084 -.669 .508 1.545
EDS SHARE % + .310 2.033 .051 2.297
EDsOPT + .166 .620 .540 7.108
EDS INCENT % + .145 .563 .578 6.569
BETA - .368 1.335 .192 7.510
Experimental variables
BETA * EDS OPT + -.124 -.340 .737 13.175
BETA * EDS SHARE % - -.829 -4.427 .000 3.477
BETA * EDS INCENT % + -.236 -.717 .479 10.751
R
2 .707
BETA * EDS OPT = Interactive term = beta * ratio of executive directors share options to
total share and option  holdings
BETA * EDS SHARE % = Interactive term = beta * percentage of executive directors share
holdings to total shares
BETA * EDS INCENT % = Interactive term = beta * Executive directors total cash and non-cash
bonus divided by total remuneration